I. Introduction
This paper analyzes assignment exchanges, a new class of multi-product exchange mechanisms which are tight simplifications of a general Walrasian mechanism tailored for cases in which goods are substitutes. The main innovation in creating the assignment exchange is the introduction of assignment messages, which describe substitutable preferences indirectly as the value of a particular linear program in which the constraints connecting different goods conform to particular limited structures.
Assignment messages are sufficiently flexible to describe realistic preferences in several interesting applications yet sufficiently compact to be usable in practice.
The "basic" assignment exchange is obtained from the general assignment exchange by a further restriction on the message space. This version of the exchange can assign and price multiple indivisible goods, generalizing the assignment mechanism introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972) . Unlike the Shapley-Shubik mechanism, the assignment exchange does not limit participants to trade on just one side of the market, or to buy or sell just a single unit, or to trade just a single type of good.
Designing the message space can be an essential step for creating a practical direct mechanism, because describing a single general "type" can require reporting vast amounts of information. For example, in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) which places doctors into hospital residency programs (Roth and Peranson (1999) ), the type of a hospital that interviews fifty candidates in the hopes of employing ten is a list of length approximately 1.3×10 10 ranking all of the subsets of size ten or less.
In FCC spectrum auction 73, completed in 2008 with the sale of 1090 radio spectrum licenses, a general type is a vector of approximate dimension 1.3×10 328 , listing values for every subset of licenses. Reports of even a tiny fraction of this length are obviously impractical.
There are two pure approaches to overcoming the length-of-report problem. The first is to simplify reporting by introducing a structured message space. For example, in the National Resident Matching Program, hospital preferences are reported as a number of positions and a rank order listing of candidates and the algorithm is specialized to take advantage of that report. The second pure approach is to abandon one-shot, direct mechanisms in favor of dynamic mechanisms with staged reporting of information (Nisan and Segal (2006) , Parkes (2003) ), so that only partial information about a participant's type is revealed at each reporting stage. Examples of dynamic multi-product mechanisms include simultaneous ascending and descending auctions (eg, Ausubel (2007) ), in which bidders are asked to report supplies or demands at a sequence of announced prices. The advantage of this approach is that some information, such as demand at some disequilibrium prices, may never need to be reported to the mechanism.
Simultaneous ascending or descending auction mechanisms have been put to use in a variety of applications in spectrums sales and the power industry (Milgrom (2004) ).
They have interesting theoretical properties. Assuming that the goods for sale are substitutes and that participants bid myopically, versions of simultaneous ascending or descending auctions not only economize on communications but also, in certain cases, identify efficient or stable allocations or find minimum or maximum market-clearing prices (Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Gul and Stacchetti (2000) , Milgrom (2000) , Ausubel (2004) , Milgrom and Strulovici (2008) ).
Multi-product ascending (and descending) auctions, however, suffer significant drawbacks that limit their usefulness. The drawbacks include high participant costs, long times-to-completion, problems of scheduling and precision. Any multi-round, real-time process adds the cost of real-time bidding to the costs of preparing for the auction. While this time cost can be reduced by using shorter rounds, such a change increases the risk of error and reduces any advantage that dynamic mechanisms may have in allowing bidders to respond thoughtfully to emerging information. In practice, dynamic auctions for gas and electricity have sometimes taken many hours to reach completion, while spectrum auctions have taken days or even weeks or months. Such long times-to-completion make these mechanisms impractical in time-sensitive markets, such as hour-ahead power markets, where only minutes are available to complete an exchange. In certain export markets, potential buyers may reside in a dozen or more different time zones, making it difficult or impossible to schedule convenient real-time bidding. Finally, real dynamic auctions typically fail to identify exact market clearing prices, because they use discrete price increments to explore market demand. Pricing errors tend to be most severe when there are many products being exchanged, because finding equilibrium prices then requires searching a high dimensional price space.
The drawbacks of dynamic, simultaneous multiple round auctions highlight the potential advantages of applying the insight of the revelation principle to create an outcome-equivalent direct mechanism. In such a mechanism, participants report substitutable preferences and market clearing prices are computed directly. The development of such a mechanism, however, has been blocked by the difficulty in finding a compact message space for reporting substitutable preferences.
The assignment mechanism addresses that problem by using assignment messages to describe a particular subset of the space of substitutable preferences. The assignment messages parameterize a particular linear program. When the assignment messages describe actual preferences, the mechanism can calculate exactly the minimum market clearing prices, duplicating in reality the theoretical performance of a perfect, continuous-time ascending clock auction. Importantly, the assignment exchange is more than an auction. For example, it can allow each individual participant to act as both buyer and seller and to link bids to buy with offers to sell. Thus, in a securities market application, a participant wishing to eliminate execution risk could link an offer to buy shares of stock with a bid to sell certain call options, specifying that the trade takes place only if the net cost per share of the transaction does not exceed a participant-specified maximum.
The assignment message space can be further simplified to make applications easier. A particularly interesting simplification uses basic assignment messages, which describe only substitutable preferences with limited one-for-one substitution, according to which, informally, the marginal rate of technical substitution between two products evaluated at any bundle is either zero or one. For example, a northern California electric utility delivering a particular mix of retail power to its customers might require a certain total amount of power from all sources, including sources in northern California, southern
California, or at the Oregon border, but may be limited in its ability to use power from each source by its source-specific transmission capacities. When the transmission capacity constraints are not binding, one unit of power from a source can be substituted at the margin for one unit from another. When some transmission constraint is binding, an additional unit of power at the constrained source displaces zero units of other power in meeting the buyer's requirement. Similarly, a cereal maker may be able to substitute bushels of grain delivered today for bushels delivered tomorrow up to a limit imposed by its grain storage capacity, or it may substitute one type or grade of grain for another onefor-one within limits specified by production requirements. These are examples of limited one-for-one substitution by buyers, but a similar pattern can sometimes be found among sellers as well, as when a manufacturer can deliver several versions of the same processed good in a total amount that is limited by the overall capacity of its factory.
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Despite its special structure, limited one-for-one substitution is frequently a useful approximation for goods that differ only in one or more of the following attributes:
location of availability, time of availability, grade (such as size, color and age), degree of processing, or delivery or contract terms.
By limiting messages to express limited one-for-one substitution, the basic assignment exchange enjoys two advantages: messages are even simpler than general assignment messages and the resulting allocations are always integer-valued. 3 The integer property can be important in some applications, such as ones where commodities are most efficiently shipped by the truck-or container-load. Even for goods like electric power, which in principle seem perfectly divisible, contracts are often denominated and traded in indivisible units, such as megawatts of power, so respecting integer constraints may sometimes be useful.
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Unlike the basic assignment exchange, the general assignment exchange allows other rates of substitution besides one-for-one. For example, in markets for electric power, the general assignment exchange would allow bidders to account explicitly for transmission losses that vary according to the source. In the basic assignment exchange, a bidder can account for such losses only imperfectly by treating the different sources as having different transmission costs, leaving the pattern of limited one-for-one substitution intact.
Any simplification limits the messages used by a mechanism, and that can affect incentives and performance. If a simplification is poorly chosen, some message profiles may be equilibria of the simplified mechanism, even though they are not equilibria in the original, extended mechanism. A tight simplification is one with the property that, for a wide range of preferences (typically far exceeding the preferences describable by the message space), all of its pure equilibria are also equilibria of the original mechanism (Milgrom (2007b) ). We show below that assignment exchanges are tight simplifications of general Walrasian exchange mechanisms.
Because the assignment messages can express only substitutable preferences, it is perhaps surprising that the basic assignment exchange nevertheless has applications to some resource allocation problems involving complementary goods, for which package mechanisms might have been thought to be necessary. Similarly, producers at B regard BC and CD as Leontieff complements. The power producers located at A, B and C compete to acquire capacity on the CD link. We assume that the costs to building new capacity on the various links are additive.
Despite the technical complementarities among successive links, preferences of both buyers and sellers over packages of transmission links can be expressed using basic assignment messages. The key lies in the way lots are defined. Suppose the exchange is organized to trade three kinds of lots. Each lot is a package of links sufficient to transmit a unit of energy from one of the points A, B and C to point D. With lots defined in that way, each energy producer/capacity buyer can bid on the lot connecting its location to the wishes to offer capacity on one of the single links AC or BC can do that using a swaplinked offers to buy and sell. For example, an offer to sell capacity on AC at a price of a price of at least X is represented as a swap that links an offer to sell capacity on the AD lot with a bid to buy equal capacity on the CD lot at a price difference of at least X. With the specified lots, both buyers and sellers can express preferences accurately. The theorems about assignment exchanges apply and imply that, despite complementarities and indivisible lots which are problematic in other settings, market clearing prices exist.
A similar construction can be used in any acyclic network by identifying one node in each component of the graph as a root and expressing all lots in terms of flows from a node to a root. Demand need not be located only at the roots for this construction to work, but the demanded packages of links must lie in sequence on one side of the root. A potentially interesting example of distributed demand is in a market for landing slots at a busy airport.
Airlines with hub-and-spoke systems usually prefer to operate groups of landing slots within a short interval of time, so that delays for passengers with connecting flights can be minimized. Suppose that landing slots are discrete and labeled by their assigned times T. To express such the airline's preferences using assignment messages, operate the exchange as if the lots in the auction were intervals of slots (0 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the assignment message space and reports three theorems about it. The first is that the assignment messages express only substitutable preferences. The second is that when all preferences are expressed by assignment messages, then the set of market clearing prices is a non-empty, closed, convex sublattice. The third is that if all participants' preferences are expressed with basic assignment messages, then there is an efficient allocation using only integer quantities of all goods. Section III provides a partial converse to the three theorems. Assignment messages require that the constraints connecting different goods form a "tree." If that constraint is relaxed at all, then the first two conclusions of section II are no longer valid. If the constraint is dropped, then the conclusion of theorem 3 fails as well. Section IV is about tightness. Its main conclusion is that the assignment exchanges, as well as "most" simplifications of these exchanges, are tight simplifications of a Walrasian mechanism. Section V discusses the connections between the assignment exchange mechanism and single product uniform price auctions and the Vickrey auction.
Section VI concludes with a discussion of steps to take the theory to applications.
II. Assignment Messages
Consider a resource allocation problem with goods indexed by 1,..., k K = and participants are indexed by 1,..., n N = . If participants' preferences are quasi-linear, then the utility for a trade is expressed as the value ( ) n V q of bundle n q acquired plus any net cash transfer. The set of demanded bundles at price vector p is arg max ( )
where n q may include both positive and negative components. A direct mechanism must specify a message space for describing n V . The assignment exchange determines n q by summing vectors nj x which denote the bundles assigned to the j th bid by bidder n.
An assignment message describes n V using a collection of bids and a set of constraints. 6 The j th bid by bidder n is a 4-tuple of vectors ( , , , ) T . This leads to a set of constraints as follows:
For example, if participant n is a seller, it could set 0 S u = for all 0 n S ∈ T and if participant n is a buyer, then it could set 0
, we also allow the following constraints:
Notice that the sums in (2), unlike those in (1), exclude the effectiveness coefficients ρ.
We require that the set nk T includes all the singleton sets {( , , )} n j k and define
This avoids the need to represent the individual bid constraints separately.
Using the bids and constraints, bidder n's "reported value" for any feasible bundle of products 1 ( ,..., )
Because the vector ( , ) 0 n n q x ≡ satisfies all the constraint in (3), the zero bundle 0 n q = is feasible. By a theorem of linear programming, the set of feasible vectors is a closed, convex set and n V is a concave function on that set. It is convenient to extend n V to all of
The next step is to define assignment messages and certain related concepts.
Definitions.
The demand correspondence for
3. The valuation n V is substitutable if for all prices , b. The terminal nodes of tree nK T are the singleton sets ( , , ) n j k { },
NT nK
T is the set of non-terminal nodes of tree nk T , for 1,..., k K = .
6. An assignment message consists of a collection of bids 
. Substitutability is equivalent to the condition that for 1,...,
Submodularity is equivalent to the condition that on the same domain,
Proof of Lemma 2. Let p and p′ be two price vectors and let z and z′ be corresponding optimal solutions, so that ( ) 
Using the tree structures, we can define notation as follows:
Using these, we may rewrite (3) as: (7) consists of a sum of submodular functions of ( , ) θ μ . Since the objective is a sum of submodular functions of ( , ) θ μ , it, too, is a submodular function of ( , ) θ μ . Also, by inspection, each constraint in (7) sublattices is a sublattice, the constraints in (7) define a sublattice.
Thus, (7) takes the form, min ( ) z g z subject to ( , ) z p S ∈ where g is submodular and S is a sublattice. Lemma 2, applies, so n π is submodular. Lemma 1 then applies, so n V is substitutable. QED Proof of Theorem 2. Since the corresponding primal problem can be represented as a continuous concave maximization on a compact set, the maximum exists and coincides with the minimum of the dual. Since the valuations are concave, the set of market-clearing prices is the set of solutions to the dual problem. Since each n π is continuous and convex, the set of minimizers of the dual problem is closed and convex.
Since each n π is submodular, by a theorem of Topkis (1978) , the set of minimizers of the dual problem is a sublattice. QED Proof of Theorem 3. We show something stronger than claimed by the theorem, namely, that there is an integer solution x * to the problem: is sufficient to show that every vertex of the simplex defined by the constraints in (8) is an integer vector.
Each vertex x of the constraint simplex is described by the equality constraints combined with its set of binding inequality constraints. It is the unique solution of a system of linear equations typically of the form = Ax b where each column of A corresponds to some S x , the first n C rows of A correspond to the equality constraints, and the remaining rows of A correspond to the binding inequality constraints at x. We wish to show that the unique solution of this system of linear equations is integer-valued.
Let us examine the equality constraints in (8), looking separately at variables S x .
If S is a root of one of the trees, then S x appears in only one equality constraint in (8). If 
In any such a system of equations, one may add or subtract one row to or from another without affecting the solution. We add or subtract the row corresponding to the binding inequality constraint for S x to rows in which the S x coefficient is non-zero to make them zero, and do the same for the other binding inequality constraints. Because the rows added or subtracted have only one non-zero entry, this procedure leaves other columns unaffected. In the example, this manipulation leads to: 
The unaffected columns have at most two non-zero elements and, if there are two, they have opposite signs.
According to a theorem of Hoffman (see Heller and Tomkins (1956) or Wikipedia.com), if a matrix has at most two non-zero elements in each column, if each element is ±1, and if two non-zero elements in the same column always have opposite signs, then the matrix is totally unimodular, that is, every square submatrix has a determinant of 0, +1, or -1. The transformed A matrix is thus totally unimodular. Since the right-hand side vector b is an integer vector, it follows from Cramer's rule that the vertex x is an integer vector. 10 QED
III. Partial Converses to Theorems 1, 2 and 3
The structure of assignment messages allows bidders to report values and effectiveness coefficients without restriction but restricts the form of constraints to be a bidder tree. The tree limitations can be imposed in software to implement the exchange.
What we show in this section is that if one fails to impose the constraint that 0 n T is a tree, then theorems 1 and 2 become invalid and theorem 3 needs an additional condition.
The main idea can be illustrated with the example of a buyer for whom the lower bounds l S are all zero. Suppose that this buyer has three bids labeled 1-3, with bid j having a non-zero value only for project j. Suppose that the binding constraints in the It is a short step from these two examples to the following theorem, the proof of which is omitted. 
IV. Tightness
A simplified direct mechanism is a direct mechanism with a restricted message space. Even the original, extended mechanism typically incorporates assumptions about preferences, and the main idea in studying simplification is to relax even those to examine how simplification affects equilibrium. A simplified direct mechanism is tight if every strategy profile that is an equilibrium in the simplified mechanism is also an equilibrium in the original extended mechanism. For reasons to be discussed in the next section, we are also concerned to state our theorems not just for the general assignment exchange, but also for further simplifications that assignment messages to guide exchange but limit the messages in certain ways. We prove our tightness result for further simplifications that are sufficiently expressive.
Definition. An assignment message space is sufficiently wide if it allows the bidder to report two bids, in which the value vectors nj v are unrestricted, the individual 
V. Additional Connections
Our emphasis on the multi-product nature of the assignment exchange obscures a simple connection to standard single-product exchanges, including so-called doubleauctions. In a double-auction exchange, each buyer reports a set of price-quantity pairs to determine a demand function and each seller reports similarly. The resulting demand and supply curves are intersected to determine market-clearing prices and quantities, with some selection rule applied in case there are multiple such prices or quantities. For the case of just one product ( 1 K = ), the assignment exchange reduces to the same thing.
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A second connection is to the Vickrey auction. In a Vickrey auction, if a participant n acquires a single good k, it pays the opportunity cost of that good, which is the increased optimal value of the goods to the other players if an additional unit of good k were available. In the linear program for the basic assignment exchange, the lowest market-clearing price k p for good k is its shadow price -the amount by which the optimal value would increase if one more unit of good k were made available to the coalition of all players. If participant n has demand for just one unit in total and acquires a unit of good k, then k p is necessarily the increased optimal value of that unit to the remaining participants. These statements can be routinely converted into a mathematical argument by introducing extra notation, which is suppressed here. The conclusion is the following.
Theorem 6. Suppose that some participant n bids to acquire at most one unit in a basic assignment exchange. Suppose the exchange rules select a price vector p which is the minimum market clearing price vector. Then, if n acquires a unit of good k, the price k p is equal to n's Vickrey price.
A symmetric statement can be made about participants who sell one unit and exchanges that select the maximum market clearing price vector.
VI. From Theory to Practice
Depending on the particular market to be organized, there can be many steps from this theory to practice. We have already seen how the implementation of multi-product clock auctions can be handicapped by finite bid increments, scheduling issues, and short market periods and how the scope of the assignment exchange can depend on the specification of lots. These are typical sorts of issues in applied market design.
The main practical limitations of assignment exchanges are associated with its enforced simplification of preference reports. We turn to those below. Before emphasizing the limitations of the exchange, however, it is appropriate to recognize cases in which even the simplest assignment messages can be effective. Suppose, for example, that an electricity buyer n can purchase power from any of three sources, A, B or C, subject to transmission costs ( , , ) Swap bids have the potential to add liquidity to an exchange hindered by lack of volume. Investigating this requires a theory of why owners do not constantly participate in a market, and a full analysis of that is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is clear that in a market with modest liquidity, swaps encourage participation by limiting the risk that one part of an intended transaction might be executed without the other parts.
For example, with separate markets, a swapper with a budget limit might have to sell one commodity before buying the other in order to raise funds to transact, leaving the swapper exposed to the risk of not finding a seller for the other part of the planned transaction. By eliminating such risks, swaps make participation safer, increasing liquidity.
The power of simple assignment messages in the examples given above is important because simplicity is often an important design goal. One might simplify the general assignment exchange by limiting the number of bids or constraints or levels in the constraint trees. Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 5 have been constructed to apply even to exchanges that incorporate additional simplifications.
One kind of common constraint that is not fully reflected in the theorem 5 arises when the exchange limits a participant's role. For example, only certain parties may be qualified sellers of particular goods, as implemented by a restriction limiting when 0 njk l < is permitted. This can be significant for conclusions about tightness, and it is natural to investigate extensions of theorem 5 by imposing similar restrictions on the related Walrasian exchange.
Another common limitation imposed by operators is a credit limit on buyers.
Whether this is implemented as a limit on the maximum acceptable bid from a bidder or as a limit on the maximum quantities that can be demanded, the result is simply to restrict the bidder to a subset of the assignment message space, so the theorems continue to apply.
When bidder market power in an auction is alleged, it may be good policy to limit the total quantity of all goods or only of certain goods k purchased by some set of bidders. Such a policy leads to constraints that are complex because they combine bids across bidders. If resale is can be restricted, then one way to implement this is by product redefinition. For example, if the operator wants to limit bidders 1 and 2 to purchase no more than half of the available units of good 1, it can accomplish that by splitting good 1 into types 1A and 1B and restricting bidders 1 and 2 from bidding on type 1B. This procedure has precedent: it is similar to the set-asides used by the US Federal Communications Commission to restrict purchases by incumbents in some auctions.
Whether the assignment messages are sufficiently encompassing is likely to vary by application. Certainly, scale economies and complements among lots are sometimes important and cannot always be solved merely by redefining lots. For example, in electricity, generating plants typically have large fixed costs that require all or nothing decisions about whether to use their power capacity. While such limits are not directly expressed using assignment messages, it is often possible to use the assignment exchange as part of a solution. One ad hoc procedure is to operate the exchange in two or more rounds to allow preliminary price discovery to guide bids at the final round. This does not entirely eliminate the fixed cost problem, but it may sometimes mitigate it. Staged dynamics of this sort may also be helpful when there are important common value elements or when bidders can invest in information gathering during the process, as in Compte and Jehiel (2000) or Rezende (2005) .
A more exact procedure incorporates the assignment exchange as an element within a general combinatorial auction or exchange. For example, participants might be allowed to report fixed costs of transacting in addition to their assignment messages.
Doing that would lead to a two-stage problem, in which finding the right set of participants is a combinatorial optimization problem, but finding the allocation for a given set of participants is an assignment exchange problem. Similarly, in the airline slot problem, if there is no single time T that is covered by all the relevant intervals, it may still be possible to organize the optimization around a limited number of such times -the combinatorial part of the problem -and to allow the assignment exchange to solve the remaining part.
As described in the introduction, direct, sealed-bid mechanisms have important advantages over ascending or descending auctions, particularly for time-sensitive applications. The proposed exchanges are tight, simple to use, fast to execute, and precise in determining equilibrium prices and goods assignments. Assignment messages provide a compact expression of a useful set of substitutable preferences for a range of applications and the basic assignment messages further lead to integer assignments. The exchange design is robust in the sense that it can be further restricted in a variety of ways without destroying its key properties, and maximal in the sense no extensions of the cross-product bid tree constraints are possible without destroying the key substitutes properties of the mechanism. In combination, these attributes make the assignment exchange an attractive candidate for many practical applications.
